“Absolute Immunity” & Defamation

A few years ago, I posed the following question and answer on Minnesota Litigator:

If a Minnesota litigator (that is, NOT “Minnesota Litigator,” but just any old Minnesota litigator) files a malicious complaint — that is, a formal legal complaint in court including knowingly false and damaging statements — can she be successfully sued for defamation? Probably not (assuming the statement has “reference and relation to the subject matter of the action”).

Absolute immunity for defamatory statements made by participants in the course of a judicial proceeding dates back at least to the sixteenth century, the Minnesota Supreme Court has pointed out.

I followed up with the question: What if Minnesota Litigator then publishes the Minnesota litigator’s false, damaging, and malicious complaint?  Can Minnesota Litigator be successfully sued for defamation?   Probably not. (Substantial repetition of an absolutely privileged statement does not trigger liability).

Note I give myself wiggle room: “Probably not.”  I would have thought that a law professor’s article reciting allegations in a complaint in a law review article would be safe from a claim for defamation but, then again…

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Verdict Against BNSF For Catastrophic Anoka Crossing Accident Reinstated by Minnesota Supreme Court

Update #3 (March 28, 2012): The BNSF railroad defended this terrible crossing accident case (described below) by arguing that the railroad met applicable standards of care under Minnesota law and then, after the case was tried before a jury, tried to prevail on a federal preemption theory — that is, arguing to the court that the railroad met applicable federal regulations so Minnesota’s standard of care would be beside the point.  

No go, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled today.  Lawyers are very familiar with arguing alternative grounds, whether on behalf of plaintiffs or defendants.  But judicial economy and fairness both favor rules requiring the arguments be voiced on the front-end rather than the back-end.   Continue reading

Mooney v. Allianz: Allianz Unsuccessful In Attempt to Broaden Its Series of Wins Still Farther

Update #3 (May 17, 2011): The Mooney class action was filed in U.S. District Court (District of Minnesota) in February, 2006.  Anyone who wants to track the long hard road of nationwide class action litigation should read the string of posts below and U.S. District Court Judge Ann D. Montgomery’s decision, issued last week, in which Defendant Allianz sought (unsuccessfully) to broaden the application of favorable rulings to put all of the cases against based on similar allegations across the country finally to rest.

Update  #2 (February 1, 2011):  If you don’t succeed, try, try again, and again, and again, and again, and again…. (?)  A victorious defendant might have other ideas…(Allianz moves for an injunction to halt second, third, fourth, fifth, etc., “bites at the apple.”)  The case is before U.S. District Court Judge Ann D. Montgomery (D. Minn.).

(February 1, 2010):  Minnesota Litigator reported a serious defeat for plaintiffs’ class action lawyers in the Mooney v. Allianz case late last year.  Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to salvage some benefit from this long battle by seeking injunctive relief which, if awarded, would have given them attorneys’ fees.  (The jury had found that defendant Allianz “use[d] a misrepresentation or deceptive practice in the course of selling its two-tiered annuities” and “intend[ed] that others would rely on the misrepresentation or deceptive practice,” but that none of the class members were “harmed as a direct result of the misrepresentation or deceptive practice.”)  Plaintiffs had two theories, both of which the Court (U.S. District Court Judge Ann Montgomery (D. Minn.)) rejected.

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Siewart v. Northern States Power, dba Xcel Energy: Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

Update:  ”If you are going to predict,” my uncle (who was a stock broker) used to advise us, “predict often.”

Minnesota Litigator has had a fairly high percentage correct predictions of pending court decisions in the past couple of years, but got this one wrong (see below for a case description and prediction), although it was a very close case (3-2, opinion by Justice Page, joined by Meyer and G. Barry Anderson, Justices Gildea and Dietzen, dissenting, and Justice Stras, taking no part).

The opinions total 43 pages and discuss the filed rate doctrine, primary jurisdiction, and the applicability of Minnesota’s statute of repose for improvements to real property. Continue reading

Fired for Opposing a Practice Mistakenly Believed to Violate State Human Rights Act?

[UPDATE:  Originally posted in January, another correct Minnesota Litigator prediction, and another Plaintiff fares badly at the Minnesota Supreme Court (opinion here (Judges Page, Meyer, and Anderson, Paul, dissenting in two separate dissenting opinions)).]

Let’s say an employer (say, Capella University) terminates an employee (Elen Bahr) because, asked to perform some act, she refused, sincerely (but maybe mistakenly) believing that the action she was being asked to perform violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act.  Can she sue the employer for retaliation?

The issue was whether Plaintiff’s subordinate, a minority employee, was to be put on a “PIP,” or “performance improvement plan,” and Plainitff Bahr felt the employee should have been placed on a PIP but was not put on one because of her minority race.  Bahr alleges she was terminated, at least in part, due to her objection to this disparate treatment of this minority employee.

In considering whether a particular employee should be put on a PIP, if different employees might be treated differently, is this discriminatory and violative of the act?  Assuming not, would Bahr still have a claim for “reprisal” under the Minnesota Human Rights Act because she thought it was?  The Minnesota Supreme Court heard oral argument on this issue on January 5.

Chief Judge Magnuson gave plaintiff’s counsel a hard time on her proposition that any differential treatment of an employee constitutes prohibited discrimination.

Frances Baillon, of Halunen & Associates, argued for the plaintiff.  She faced a lot of hard questioning and I think we can predict reversal of the intermediate appellate court decision in her client’s favor.  Thomas Harder, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, argued on behalf of Capella University.

ACLU v. Tarek Ibn Zayad Academy: Dispute over Scope of Protective Order

[UPDATE:  Mag. Judge Jeanne Graham (D. Minn.) rejects the defendant's theory of the breadth of privilege from discovery but provides a procedure to evaluate a subset of some of the privilege claims made.]

Arguing for a protective order of a scope and breadth that this author’s not seen before, counsel for Taren Ibn Zayad Academy seeks to designate as confidential “all information disclosed by the TiZA Defendants.” The TiZA Defendants sought this based on “repeated threats of brutal violence against TiZA and its teachers, students and staff.” Any such threats are, of course, reprehensible (and perhaps criminal) but it is unclear why the existence of such threats mandates a protective order of such a breadth. (The TiZA defendants’ argument is broader than this. See the entire argument after the break.)

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